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Commit 12dc9a35 authored by Robbert Krebbers's avatar Robbert Krebbers
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Consistently use `Recv`.

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theories/channel/channel.v
+ 9
− 9
View file @ 12dc9a35
......@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ lock-protected buffers, and their primitive proof rules. Moreover:
- It defines the connective [c ↣ prot] for ownership of channel endpoints,
which describes that channel endpoint [c] adheres to protocol [prot].
- It proves Actris's specifications of [send] and [receive] w.r.t. dependent
- It proves Actris's specifications of [send] and [recv] w.r.t. dependent
separation protocols.
An encoding of the usual branching connectives [prot1 <{Q1}+{Q2}> prot2] and
......@@ -104,13 +104,13 @@ Typeclasses Opaque iProto_branch.
Arguments iProto_branch {_} _ _%I _%I _%proto _%proto.
Instance: Params (@iProto_branch) 2 := {}.
Infix "<{ P1 }+{ P2 }>" := (iProto_branch Send P1 P2) (at level 85) : proto_scope.
Infix "<{ P1 }&{ P2 }>" := (iProto_branch Receive P1 P2) (at level 85) : proto_scope.
Infix "<{ P1 }&{ P2 }>" := (iProto_branch Recv P1 P2) (at level 85) : proto_scope.
Infix "<+{ P2 }>" := (iProto_branch Send True P2) (at level 85) : proto_scope.
Infix "<&{ P2 }>" := (iProto_branch Receive True P2) (at level 85) : proto_scope.
Infix "<&{ P2 }>" := (iProto_branch Recv True P2) (at level 85) : proto_scope.
Infix "<{ P1 }+>" := (iProto_branch Send P1 True) (at level 85) : proto_scope.
Infix "<{ P1 }&>" := (iProto_branch Receive P1 True) (at level 85) : proto_scope.
Infix "<{ P1 }&>" := (iProto_branch Recv P1 True) (at level 85) : proto_scope.
Infix "<+>" := (iProto_branch Send True True) (at level 85) : proto_scope.
Infix "<&>" := (iProto_branch Receive True True) (at level 85) : proto_scope.
Infix "<&>" := (iProto_branch Recv True True) (at level 85) : proto_scope.
Section channel.
Context `{!heapG Σ, !chanG Σ}.
......@@ -233,9 +233,9 @@ Section channel.
Qed.
Lemma try_recv_spec_packed {TT} c (pc : TT → val * iProp Σ * iProto Σ) :
{{{ c ↣ iProto_message Receive pc }}}
{{{ c ↣ iProto_message Recv pc }}}
try_recv c
{{{ v, RET v; (⌜v = NONEV⌝ ∧ c ↣ iProto_message Receive pc) ∨
{{{ v, RET v; (⌜v = NONEV⌝ ∧ c ↣ iProto_message Recv pc) ∨
(∃ x : TT, ⌜v = SOMEV ((pc x).1.1)⌝ ∗ c ↣ (pc x).2 ∗ (pc x).1.2) }}}.
Proof.
rewrite iProto_mapsto_eq. iIntros (Φ) "Hc HΦ". wp_lam; wp_pures.
......@@ -267,7 +267,7 @@ Section channel.
Qed.
Lemma recv_spec_packed {TT} c (pc : TT → val * iProp Σ * iProto Σ) :
{{{ c ↣ iProto_message Receive pc }}}
{{{ c ↣ iProto_message Recv pc }}}
recv c
{{{ x, RET (pc x).1.1; c ↣ (pc x).2 ∗ (pc x).1.2 }}}.
Proof.
......@@ -280,7 +280,7 @@ Section channel.
(** A version written without Texan triples that is more convenient to use
(via [iApply] in Coq. *)
Lemma recv_spec {TT} Φ c (pc : TT → val * iProp Σ * iProto Σ) :
c ↣ iProto_message Receive pc -∗
c ↣ iProto_message Recv pc -∗
▷ (∀.. x : TT, c ↣ (pc x).2 -∗ (pc x).1.2 -∗ Φ (pc x).1.1) -∗
WP recv c {{ Φ }}.
Proof.
......
theories/channel/proofmode.v
+ 3
− 3
View file @ 12dc9a35
......@@ -33,8 +33,8 @@ Class ActionDualIf (d : bool) (a1 a2 : action) :=
Hint Mode ActionDualIf ! ! - : typeclass_instances.
Instance action_dual_if_false a : ActionDualIf false a a := eq_refl.
Instance action_dual_if_true_send : ActionDualIf true Send Receive := eq_refl.
Instance action_dual_if_true_receive : ActionDualIf true Receive Send := eq_refl.
Instance action_dual_if_true_send : ActionDualIf true Send Recv := eq_refl.
Instance action_dual_if_true_recv : ActionDualIf true Recv Send := eq_refl.
Class ProtoNormalize {Σ} (d : bool) (p : iProto Σ)
(pas : list (bool * iProto Σ)) (q : iProto Σ) :=
......@@ -166,7 +166,7 @@ End classes.
Lemma tac_wp_recv `{!chanG Σ, !heapG Σ} {TT : tele} Δ i j K
c p (pc : TT → val * iProp Σ * iProto Σ) Φ :
envs_lookup i Δ = Some (false, c ↣ p)%I →
ProtoNormalize false p [] (iProto_message Receive pc) →
ProtoNormalize false p [] (iProto_message Recv pc) →
let Δ' := envs_delete false i false Δ in
(∀.. x : TT,
match envs_app false
......
theories/channel/proto.v
+ 27
− 27
View file @ 12dc9a35
......@@ -121,24 +121,24 @@ Notation "<!> 'MSG' v ; p" :=
Notation "<?> x1 .. xn , 'MSG' v {{ P } } ; p" :=
(iProto_message
Receive
Recv
(tele_app (TT:=TeleS (λ x1, .. (TeleS (λ xn, TeleO)) .. )) $
λ x1, .. (λ xn, (v%V,P%I,p%proto)) ..))
(at level 20, x1 binder, xn binder, v at level 20, P, p at level 200) : proto_scope.
Notation "<?> x1 .. xn , 'MSG' v ; p" :=
(iProto_message
Receive
Recv
(tele_app (TT:=TeleS (λ x1, .. (TeleS (λ xn, TeleO)) .. )) $
λ x1, .. (λ xn, (v%V,True%I,p%proto)) ..))
(at level 20, x1 binder, xn binder, v at level 20, p at level 200) : proto_scope.
Notation "<?> 'MSG' v {{ P } } ; p" :=
(iProto_message
Receive
Recv
(tele_app (TT:=TeleO) (v%V,P%I,p%proto)))
(at level 20, v at level 20, P, p at level 200) : proto_scope.
Notation "<?> 'MSG' v ; p" :=
(iProto_message
Receive
Recv
(tele_app (TT:=TeleO) (v%V,True%I,p%proto)))
(at level 20, v at level 20, p at level 200) : proto_scope.
......@@ -190,21 +190,21 @@ Definition iProto_le_pre {Σ V}
p1 ≡ proto_message a1 pc1 ∗
p2 ≡ proto_message a2 pc2 ∗
match a1, a2 with
| Receive, Receive =>
| Recv, Recv =>
∀ v p1', pc1 v (proto_eq_next p1') -∗
◇ ∃ p2', ▷ rec p1' p2' ∗ pc2 v (proto_eq_next p2')
| Send, Send =>
∀ v p2', pc2 v (proto_eq_next p2') -∗
◇ ∃ p1', ▷ rec p1' p2' ∗ pc1 v (proto_eq_next p1')
| Receive, Send =>
| Recv, Send =>
∀ v1 v2 p1' p2',
pc1 v1 (proto_eq_next p1') -∗ pc2 v2 (proto_eq_next p2') -∗
◇ ∃ pc1' pc2' pt,
▷ rec p1' (proto_message Send pc1') ∗
▷ rec (proto_message Receive pc2') p2' ∗
▷ rec (proto_message Recv pc2') p2' ∗
pc1' v2 (proto_eq_next pt) ∗
pc2' v1 (proto_eq_next pt)
| Send, Receive => False
| Send, Recv => False
end.
Instance iProto_le_pre_ne {Σ V} (rec : iProto Σ V → iProto Σ V → iProp Σ) :
NonExpansive2 (iProto_le_pre rec).
......@@ -235,12 +235,12 @@ Fixpoint iProto_interp_aux {Σ V} (n : nat)
| S n =>
(∃ vl vsl' pc p2',
⌜ vsl = vl :: vsl' ⌝ ∗
iProto_le (proto_message Receive pc) pr ∗
iProto_le (proto_message Recv pc) pr ∗
pc vl (proto_eq_next p2') ∗
iProto_interp_aux n vsl' vsr pl p2') ∨
(∃ vr vsr' pc p1',
⌜ vsr = vr :: vsr' ⌝ ∗
iProto_le (proto_message Receive pc) pl ∗
iProto_le (proto_message Recv pc) pl ∗
pc vr (proto_eq_next p1') ∗
iProto_interp_aux n vsl vsr' p1' pr)
end.
......@@ -431,12 +431,12 @@ Section proto.
| Send =>
∀ v p2', pc2 v (proto_eq_next p2') -∗
◇ ∃ p1', ▷ iProto_le p1' p2' ∗ pc1 v (proto_eq_next p1')
| Receive =>
| Recv =>
∀ v1 v2 p1' p2',
pc1 v1 (proto_eq_next p1') -∗ pc2 v2 (proto_eq_next p2') -∗
◇ ∃ pc1' pc2' pt,
▷ iProto_le p1' (proto_message Send pc1') ∗
▷ iProto_le (proto_message Receive pc2') p2' ∗
▷ iProto_le (proto_message Recv pc2') p2' ∗
pc1' v2 (proto_eq_next pt) ∗
pc2' v1 (proto_eq_next pt)
end.
......@@ -451,8 +451,8 @@ Section proto.
Qed.
Lemma iProto_le_recv_inv p1 pc2 :
iProto_le p1 (proto_message Receive pc2) -∗ ∃ pc1,
p1 ≡ proto_message Receive pc1 ∗
iProto_le p1 (proto_message Recv pc2) -∗ ∃ pc1,
p1 ≡ proto_message Recv pc1 ∗
∀ v p1', pc1 v (proto_eq_next p1') -∗
◇ ∃ p2', ▷ iProto_le p1' p2' ∗ pc2 v (proto_eq_next p2').
Proof.
......@@ -542,7 +542,7 @@ Section proto.
⌜(pc1 x1).1.1 = (pc2 x2).1.1⌝ ∗
▷ (pc2 x2).1.2 ∗
▷ iProto_le (pc1 x1).2 (pc2 x2).2) -∗
iProto_le (iProto_message Receive pc1) (iProto_message Receive pc2).
iProto_le (iProto_message Recv pc1) (iProto_message Recv pc2).
Proof.
iIntros "H". rewrite iProto_le_unfold iProto_message_eq.
iRight. iExists _, _, _, _; do 2 (iSplit; [done|]).
......@@ -557,7 +557,7 @@ Section proto.
⌜(pc1 x1).1.1 = (pc2 x2).1.1⌝ ∗
(pc2 x2).1.2 ∗
iProto_le (pc1 x1).2 (pc2 x2).2) -∗
iProto_le (iProto_message Receive pc1) (iProto_message Receive pc2).
iProto_le (iProto_message Recv pc1) (iProto_message Recv pc2).
Proof.
iIntros "H". iApply iProto_le_recv. iIntros (x2) "Hpc".
rewrite bi_tforall_forall. iDestruct ("H" with "Hpc") as "H".
......@@ -574,10 +574,10 @@ Section proto.
⌜(pc1 x1).1.1 = (pc4 x4).1.1⌝ ∗
⌜(pc2 x2).1.1 = (pc3 x3).1.1⌝ ∗
▷ iProto_le (pc1 x1).2 (iProto_message Send pc3) ∗
▷ iProto_le (iProto_message Receive pc4) (pc2 x2).2 ∗
▷ iProto_le (iProto_message Recv pc4) (pc2 x2).2 ∗
▷ (pc3 x3).1.2 ∗ ▷ (pc4 x4).1.2 ∗
▷ ((pc3 x3).2 ≡ (pc4 x4).2)) -∗
iProto_le (iProto_message Receive pc1) (iProto_message Send pc2).
iProto_le (iProto_message Recv pc1) (iProto_message Send pc2).
Proof.
iIntros "H". rewrite iProto_le_unfold iProto_message_eq.
iRight. iExists _, _, _, _; do 2 (iSplit; [done|]); simpl.
......@@ -598,10 +598,10 @@ Section proto.
⌜(pc1 x1).1.1 = (pc4 x4).1.1⌝ ∗
⌜(pc2 x2).1.1 = (pc3 x3).1.1⌝ ∗
iProto_le (pc1 x1).2 (iProto_message Send pc3) ∗
iProto_le (iProto_message Receive pc4) (pc2 x2).2 ∗
iProto_le (iProto_message Recv pc4) (pc2 x2).2 ∗
(pc3 x3).1.2 ∗ (pc4 x4).1.2 ∗
((pc3 x3).2 ≡ (pc4 x4).2)) -∗
iProto_le (iProto_message Receive pc1) (iProto_message Send pc2).
iProto_le (iProto_message Recv pc1) (iProto_message Send pc2).
Proof.
iIntros "H". iApply iProto_le_swap. iIntros (x1 x2) "Hpc1 Hpc2".
repeat setoid_rewrite bi_tforall_forall. iDestruct ("H" with "Hpc1 Hpc2") as "H".
......@@ -618,10 +618,10 @@ Section proto.
Lemma iProto_le_swap_simple {TT1 TT2} (v1 : TT1 → V) (v2 : TT2 → V)
(P1 : TT1 → iProp Σ) (P2 : TT2 → iProp Σ) (p : TT1 → TT2 → iProto Σ V) :
⊢ iProto_le
(iProto_message Receive (λ x1,
(iProto_message Recv (λ x1,
(v1 x1, P1 x1, iProto_message Send (λ x2, (v2 x2, P2 x2, p x1 x2)))))
(iProto_message Send (λ x2,
(v2 x2, P2 x2, iProto_message Receive (λ x1, (v1 x1, P1 x1, p x1 x2))))).
(v2 x2, P2 x2, iProto_message Recv (λ x1, (v1 x1, P1 x1, p x1 x2))))).
Proof.
iApply iProto_le_swap. iIntros (x1 x2) "/= HP1 HP2".
iExists TT2, TT1, (λ x2, (v2 x2, P2 x2, p x1 x2)),
......@@ -717,12 +717,12 @@ Section proto.
iProto_le (iProto_dual p) pr) ∨
(∃ vl vsl' pc pr',
⌜ vsl = vl :: vsl' ⌝ ∗
iProto_le (proto_message Receive pc) pr ∗
iProto_le (proto_message Recv pc) pr ∗
pc vl (proto_eq_next pr') ∗
iProto_interp vsl' vsr pl pr') ∨
(∃ vr vsr' pc pl',
⌜ vsr = vr :: vsr' ⌝ ∗
iProto_le (proto_message Receive pc) pl ∗
iProto_le (proto_message Recv pc) pl ∗
pc vr (proto_eq_next pl') ∗
iProto_interp vsl vsr' pl' pr).
Proof.
......@@ -824,7 +824,7 @@ Section proto.
Lemma iProto_interp_recv vl vsl vsr pl pr pcr :
iProto_interp (vl :: vsl) vsr pl pr -∗
iProto_le pr (proto_message Receive pcr) -∗
iProto_le pr (proto_message Recv pcr) -∗
◇ ∃ pr, pcr vl (proto_eq_next pr) ∗ ▷ iProto_interp vsl vsr pl pr.
Proof.
iIntros "H Hle". iDestruct (iProto_interp_le_r with "H Hle") as "H".
......@@ -916,7 +916,7 @@ Section proto.
Lemma iProto_recv_l {TT} γ (pc : TT → V * iProp Σ * iProto Σ V) vr vsr vsl :
iProto_ctx γ vsl (vr :: vsr) -∗
iProto_own γ Left (iProto_message Receive pc) ==∗
iProto_own γ Left (iProto_message Recv pc) ==∗
▷ ▷ ∃ (x : TT),
⌜ vr = (pc x).1.1 ⌝ ∗
iProto_ctx γ vsl vsr ∗
......@@ -938,7 +938,7 @@ Section proto.
Lemma iProto_recv_r {TT} γ (pc : TT → V * iProp Σ * iProto Σ V) vl vsr vsl :
iProto_ctx γ (vl :: vsl) vsr -∗
iProto_own γ Right (iProto_message Receive pc) ==∗
iProto_own γ Right (iProto_message Recv pc) ==∗
▷ ▷ ∃ (x : TT),
⌜ vl = (pc x).1.1 ⌝ ∗
iProto_ctx γ vsl vsr ∗
......
theories/channel/proto_model.v
+ 3
− 3
View file @ 12dc9a35
......@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ recursive domain equation:
Here, the left-hand side of the sum is used for the terminated process, while
the right-hand side is used for the communication constructors. The type
[action] is an inductively defined datatype with two constructors [Send] and
[Receive]. Compared to having an additional sum in [proto], this makes it
[Recv]. Compared to having an additional sum in [proto], this makes it
possible to factorize the code in a better way.
The remainder [V → (▶ proto → PROP) → PROP)] is a predicate that ranges over
......@@ -39,10 +39,10 @@ From iris.algebra Require Import cofe_solver.
Set Default Proof Using "Type".
Module Export action.
Inductive action := Send | Receive.
Inductive action := Send | Recv.
Instance action_inhabited : Inhabited action := populate Send.
Definition action_dual (a : action) : action :=
match a with Send => Receive | Receive => Send end.
match a with Send => Recv | Recv => Send end.
Instance action_dual_involutive : Involutive (=) action_dual.
Proof. by intros []. Qed.
Canonical Structure actionO := leibnizO action.
......
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